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680 MARLENEE v. BROWN ,[21 C.2d 
recortled. As a wItness for the" appellant, Gaston declared 
that heneve~ had. ,possessiono! it nor did 1>c knqw. of its 
existence.Concerriingth,e other reco,rded,instrllIDent, Gaston 
did not directly deny' that, he signed a deed to Ta:Ylo~. He 
a~niltted that he signed ,i some' document' 'while in the office 
of Miss PattIson. ' lie also said the document "iitay have 
been:; a deed" and 'that'while he was there; on(j,ormore 
. ., '" ,". ....., .', " 
docmnents were handed hack and forth between him and 
Mr. Taylor and Mfss :r,aulson. 
From 'this and the other ,evidence the trial ,court might 
have found ihatGaston delivered his deed to Taylor at ,the 
time he,~igriedan~aGknowledge4 itwitl{the inte;nt~o~th~t 
it shoUld, convey tItle. And M:r!!; Marlenee's admI~~Qn that 
she "a;rrilnged :with ,T. 0 .. , Taylor 'to takethetitle'in his 
own 'nanie, thiough ,Gaston, hold it as long as he ¢oul~,~', and,' 
then, seU it riertaiD.ly iInports ,a full intention, that Gaston 
.' .• ' .' .,. ..','. .If 
should. obtain ' a.' merchantable title. Under these CIrCum-st~l1ce~ there .was a 'leg~ldeli~~ry of her deed; , 
[11] In denial of anysucnplan, the appellant insists th~t 
the a:f6.davitsand al~o the notice to tenants of'Ma:rch 30th ,re" 
cei~ed in e~dence aremadmissible against' her 'because ,they 
were ()btai~edbyTaylor for his benefit while acting ,as '~t· 
torney. for her. The confi,dential relationShip of attorney 
andciient, Mrs. Ma.rlenee. a~ert!!, raises' a ,pr,esumption of 
lack of consideration ,ilnduridlleinfluerice which was. notre-
butted (sec. 2235,' Civ.Code.) . Itowever, ,assUIning that,' the 
statementS of fact con:cerningth~ sale to Gaston are an "a4-
vantage'; obtained by Taylor, as attorney, which may' be 
qneliltioned in an action' between: the client 'and asucce~or 
in titl~" of the attorney, ,there is ample evidence, in the 
record to support the implied 'finding of the trial court that 
they were not obtained by any undue influence. The same 
may be said of the notIce to tenants. Certainly from th~ 
evidence before it, the trial court was entirely justified in 
concluding that the appeUantwas thoroughly conversant with 
every move made by Taylol' in connection with the prop-
erty and that she fully 'agreed upon the method used in 
conveying title to the respondents. 
[12] The appellant complains oUhe trial court's failure to 
determine the issue, of the asserted fraud perpetrated upon 
her by Taylor. But"itdid find ' that if there was such fraud, 
ther~spondent<l had no knowledge of it and are not affected 
thereby. Another finding' is that they are bona fide pur. 
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cha:sersi which compels a judgment in favor of. the,respon-
delrts, hence aily determination of the iS$ueQf fraud 88 
between the appellant 'and Taylor Was immat~:tial; and Un.; 
J1eeessary; (RUSsell v. RiZey& Peterson, 82 CaLApp.'728 
[256~;557].) , " ,,' 
',[13J It is also asserted that the trial judge e':rrQneously,ad- . 
mitted mto evide;nce, over· objection, aPllrPorte4, as$i~trleilt 
ofMi-s: Madenee's' dililtributive share 'itt. the~taie~fher 
deceased husband, and that she was not aHowed to testifY' 
as to when, how,and' for whatpurpo$¢, she placed her signa..:. 
ture Upon it. '.As no, finding was made' .conee.rning this 
'instrument, and the C\ourt did not conclude thatthere$pond-
e~ts ,pave any title because of it, the rUlings, have notpreju~, 
dIced the appellant. ' .,' , 
'The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J:"Traynor,J., 
,and Peters,J., pro tem., concurred. . , 
"Appellant's petition for a rehearmg was denied March 29, 
1943. " , 
[L~A. No. 18263. In Bank. Mar. 1,1943.] 
MARIAN V ALLERA, Respondent, v. CONCEZIO V AL~ 
LERA, Appellant. 
[1] Marriage-Void Marriage~lncidents.-A woman who 'lives, 
with a man as his wue in the belief that a valid marriage exists 
is entitled, upon termination of their relationship, to share in, 
the p.rop~r.ty acql,lired by them during itS existence, The prop;-
erty IS dIVIded as community,property would be upon a divorce, 
irrespective of the proportionate contributions of each. 
'. [2] Id.-Void Marriages-Incidents-Belief._The essential basis 
of a putative marriage is a belief of the existenceof'a valid 
marriage. Such belief in good faith is lacking wherethu, per-
[l]Ri~htsrespecting property' accumulated by persons liVing in 
,~licitrelations, notei 75 A.L.R. 732. See, also, 16 Cal.Jur~ 926; 
35 Am.Jur. 214. ' , 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Marriage, § 22; [5] Aliensl § 26. 
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son claiming such belief knows at the beginning of her rela-
tionshipwith a man that he is married, and this, even though 
the marriage is dissolved during the continuan<\eof the rela-
tionship where neither party is aware of the dissolution. 
[3] ld. - Void Marriages-Incidents-Belief.-A woman living 
with a man as' his wife but with no genuine belief that she is 
legally married to him does not acquire by reason of cohabita-
tion alone the rights of a cotenant in his earnings and accumu-
lations during the period of their relationship. 
[4] Id.-VoidMarriages-lncidents-Agreement as to Property.-
If a man and woman live together as husband and wife under 
an agreement to pool their earnings and share' equally in their 
joint 'accumlliations, equity will protect the interests of' each 
in said pr()perty. Even in the absence. of an express agreement 
to that effect, the woman would be entitled to share in prop-
erty jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds con-
tributed toward its acquisition. 
[5] Aliens-Rights~Defense of Action.-A person convicted of 
falsely repre!enting his citizenship is not precluded from chal-
lenging. a court's jurisdiction over his property. 
APPEAL from part of a judgment of the Superior Court 
. of Los Angeles County. Thomas C. Gould, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for separate maintenance and division of comm1.lUity 
property. Part of judgment adjudging ownership of property 
in cotenancy; affirmed. 
Zagon. & Aaron, S. S. Zagon and L. B. Minter for Appel-
lant. 
William Ellis Lady for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.~Plaintiff brought this action for separate 
maintenance and for a division of community property, which 
she alleged was worth at least $60,000. She relied' on an 
alleged . common law marriage contracted in Michigan on 
December 16, 1938, and accused defendant of extreme cruelty, 
desertion, and adultery. Defendant denied the allegations 
of the complaint and alleged that his relations with plaintiff 
were illicit and that he wa.s legally married to Lido Cappello, 
named as co-respondent in the complaint. The trial court 
found, that plaintiff and defendant did not on December' 16, 
i938, or at any other time contract a common law marriage 
Mar. 1943] VALLERA v. V ALLERA 
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in Michigan or elsewhere; that they did riot at any time enter 
into or attempt to enter into an agreement to take eaph 
other as husband and wife; that beginning in May, 1936, and 
for at least three years thereafter, plaintiff cohabited mere-
triciously with defendant; that between January, 1933, and 
December 15, 1938, defendant was married to Ethel Chippo 
Vallera; that plaintiff knew from the beginning of her rela-
tionship with defendant that he was married and under II . 
legal disability to enter into a marriage contract with her ; 
that while the marriage between defendant and Ethel Chippo 
Vail era was dissolved on December 15, 1938, neither plaintiff 
nor defendant learned of its dissolution until November, 
1939; and that on July .6, 1940, defendant entered into a 
valid marriage with Lido Cappello. The court concluded that 
plaintiff and defendant had never been husband· sndwife ; 
that plaintiff Wa.'3 not entitled to maintenance; and that there 
was no community property. It held, however, that all prop-
erty acquired by the parties between December Hi, 1938; 
and July 6, 1940, except such property as either might have 
acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, was held by them 
as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half 
thereof, and defendant has appealed. from this part of the 
judgment. He contends that since there was no marriage, 
no attempt to contract marriage, no belief in the existence of 
a valid marriage; no evidence of any agreement between the 
parties as to their property rights, and no evidence concern-
ing the accumulation of property or contributions by the 
parties thereto, plaintiff could not acquire the rights of a co-
tenant in property acquired by him during the period of 
illicit cohabitation. 
[1] It is well settled that a woman who lives With a man 
as his wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists, is entitled 
upon termination of their relationship to share in the prop~ 
erty acquired by them during its existence. (Feig v. Bank 
of Italy etc. Assn., 218 Cal. 54 [21. P.2d 421]; Figoni v. 
Figoni, 211 Cal. 354 [295 P. 339]; Schneider v. Schneider, 
183 Cal. 335 [191 P. 533, 11 A.L.R. 1386]; Ooats v. Ooats, 
160 Cal. 671 [118 P; 441, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 844] ; see 11 A.L.R. 
1394.) The proportionate contribution of each party to the 
property is immaterial in this state (Ooats v. Ooats, supra; 
Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 Cal.App. 98 [201 P. 143]), for the 
property is divided as community property wonld be upon 
.. 
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the dissolution ofa valid marriage. (Sanguinetti v. Sangui-
netti, 9 Ca1.2d 95 [69 P.2d' 845, 111 A.L,R. 342] ;lJ'eig r, 
Bank of Ameri~a etc. Assn., 5 Ca1.2d 266 [54 P .2d 3J·; 
Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Ooats v. Ooats, supra; Macch.i 
v.LaRocca, supra.) 
[2] The essential basis of a 'putative marriage, however, 
is a belief in the existence of a valid marriage. (Flanagan 
v. Oapital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307] ; see Evans; 
Property Interests Arising from Q1~asi-Jfarital Relations, 9 
Corn.hQ. 246; 20 ClI,l.L.Rev.453:) In addition, in the major-
ityof cases, the de facto wife attempted to meet the re~uisit~$ 
of a, valid, marriage, .and' the' ~arriage prOved invalId only 
because of som,eessential fact of,which she was uriaware,such, 
as the' earlier.undissolvedmartiage of orie of the partieS 
(Schneider~. Schneider, supra; Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 
110 [176 P.22, 11 A.L.R. 1391]), a consangUineous relatfon 
between the pax:ties (Figoni ~. 1J'igo'fl,i, supra; K tauter' v. 
Krauter~ 79 Okla. 30 [190P.I088)), ,01' the failure tomeet 
the requirement of solemnization. (Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal", 
App.2d 62 [89P.2d 16~] i:Ma~chi Y. La'Rocca, supra; see 
,Fung l)ai KimAh L.eong v. Lau A.h Leong, 27 F.2d 582.) , ' 
Although it is clear from the' trial court's findings that the 
parties inthe present casedrd not comply with the requisites 
of a legal marriage, pla~ntiff contends that the presumption 
that a person is innocent of crime or wrong (Code- Civ •. 
Proc. § 1963, subd.l); and the fact that tlie parties lived 
together as man and wife at a'time when both were free to 
enter into a valid marriage with one another, establis,hes that 
plaintiffbeIieved in good faith that she was the lawful wife 
of defendan,t. The findings of the trial court, however,amply 
supported by the evidence,do not substantiate the existence 
'of good faith. (See Fla'rtagan v. OapitaZ Nat. Bank, supra.) 
The removal of the harrier to a valid marria.ge between the 
parties by the dissolution of defendant's marriage to Ethel 
Chippo Vallera does 'not substantiate plaintiff's good faith, 
for the court found that neither plaintiff nor defendant was 
aware of that dissolution. [3] The controversy is thus re-
duced to the question whether a woman living with a man as 
his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married 
to him acquires by reason of, cohabitation alone the rights of 
a' co·tenaJ;lt in his earnings· and accumulations during the 
period of their relatiormhip. It. has already bepl1 answered in 
Mar. 1943] V ALLERA fl. V ALLERA 
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the negative .. (Flanaganv. OapitalNat. Bank., 213Ca~. 664. 
[3 P.2d 307].) Equitable considerations arisiI),g from, 'the 
reasonable expectation of thecontinu~tion of benefits attend .. 
ing the status of marriage entered into' hi good falthare not 
present in such ,a ,ca!)e. 
'[4] Plaintiff's lack of ,good faith in alleging the' belief 
thai she had entered into a validinarriage would not, how-
ever, 'preclude her from recovering' pr,ope,rty to whi~h"she 
would otherwise be entitled. If a man' and woman lIve to- ' 
getherashu/!!band and wife under an agreement to' poolthei,r 
earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations' 
equitywUl protect the interests 'of each in Stich l>roperty .. 
(Bacon v. Ba,con, 21 Cal.App,2d 540 [69P.2d~~41; lIfitchell 
.v. Fisk, 97 Ark. 444 [134 P. 940, 36L;RA.;'N~S:~3S1;" s~~ 
Fetg, v. Bank of America etc. A,ssn;, supr.ar1Jt'fu}k~n,';Y" 
Bracken,£>2 S.D. 252, 256 '[217 RW. 192]; llayworlh v:.' 
Williams,102 Tex. 308 [116 S.W.43, 132 AinJ3i;Rep. 879)~) 
Even in the absence of ail ~Aipi'ess agreement ~o ':that ',eftect, 
the woman would be entitled"to, share in the 'property ,j"oiiltlr 
accumulated, in the :r;>ro:r;>ortion that herfimdscontributed 
toward its acquisition. (Hayworth v. Williams, supra; Dela-
mou~ v. Roger, 7 La.Ann. 152.) There isni:) e-riden,ce tha.t the 
'parties in the present caSe ',made any agreezneli~ 'cotlce'rning 
their property' or property, rights. ,The meagei" , evidence with 
respect" tathe accumulation, of 'the alleged community prop-
erty ~an support only the, infer~nce that the property con-
sisted 'of defendant's earnings during the periodfu questiOn" 
and there is no contention' to i,he contrary. There :1s, 
thus no support in the record for the tria1 court's finding 
that the parties each 0wn~d an undivide.d, one·halfofthe 
property. acquired by either of them betw~en December 16, 
1938, and' July 5, 1940. ' 
'[5] There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that de-
fendant is not in a position to challenge the trialc~ur1/S ruI-
iitg because he stands convicted in the District Court of the 
Uriited$tates 6f falsely representing himself to, be an Ameri-
can .citizen. 
The part of, the jUdgment appealed from is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
CURTIS,J.-ldissent. I,agree with the conclusion of the 
maj<orityopinioniit. holding· that the .judgmeilt of the trial 
,686 [21 C.2d 
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court cannot be sustained 'upon the ground that (1) there 
was a valid marriage, (2) an attempt to contract a valid mar-
riage, (3). a bona fide belief in the existence or. a validma:-. 
riage,or (4) an express agreement of the p~rtIes as tot~eIr 
property rights. I disagree with the concluSlOnof the maJ~r" 
ityopinion thatin order to sustain ~he judgment of t~e t~Ial 
court there must be proof of a definIte monetary cQntrIbll~lOn 
'by the plaintiff in the form of separate property, or a contrIbu~ 
tion of her earnings as a waitress or from other employment 
outside the, home. In the absence of any proof of any cash 
or, property, contribution by the plaintiff" the holding of the 
trial court that she owned a one-half interest in the prope,rty 
accumulated must have been based upon the conclusion that 
the value of her services as a housekeeper, cook, and home-
maker was of sufficient value to warrant an equal division of 
the property. The majority opinion substitutes its ownap-
praisal of the value of her services in the home as being of 
no more value than the, cost of maintenance of herself and 
her two' children. The holding of the trial court seemS to 
me more reasonable. 
The exiStence of the illicit relationship even knowingly 
entered into, is no bar per se to an equitable division of the 
property. This is demonstrated by the cases cite~ in the 
majority opinion which hold that if there is an express agree-
ment to pool property, or if the woman's earnings co:ntribute 
to its purchase, the eXistence of the illicit rela.tionship; ~~en 
knowingly entered into, does not, bar an eqUItable dIVISIon 
of the property. This state has determined as part of its 
fundamental public policy that a wife has a one-half interest 
in marital property. The same rule, by analogy, is applied 
where the parties enter into an illicit relationship butthin~~ 
in good faith, they are married. The next step was taken In 
those caSes which hold that express agreements to' share 
equally in joint accumulations will, be enforced, and the court 
will protectthe interest of both where both contribute toward 
the purchase of the property, even though they, both knew the 
relation was illicit. LikeWise, if an express agreement will be 
enforced, th,ere is no legal, or just reason, why an implied agree-
mEmt to share the property cannot be enforced. Unless it can 
be argued that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper, and 
homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that if, when 
she contributes money to the purchase of property. her inter-
,est will be protected, then when she contributes her services 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Mar. 19431 
1 
V ALLERA 'IJ. V ALLERA 
[21 0.2d 8811 
687 
in the home, her interest in property accumulated should be 
. protected. Just because the man, who in the instant case was 
equally guilty, earned the money to buy the property, should 
not bar the woman from any rights at an in the property, 
although her services made the acquisition possible. Such a 
rule gives all the advantages to be gained from such a rela-
tionship to the man with no burdens. 
The majority opinion concedes that in determining the 
value of a woman's services in maintaining a home the courts 
have held, in instances involving the absence of a valid mar-
riage but the existenM of a bona fide belief in the existence 
of a marriage, that upon the termination of the relation, the 
property will be divided as community, property would be 
upon the dissolution of a valid marriage and that the propor-
tionate contribution of each party to the purchase of the prop-
erty is immaterial. (Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 CaLApp. 98 [201 
P. 143].) Unless the underlying purpose be to punish the 
woman for participating in the illicit relationship-which 
idea of punishment obviously has no just place in a contro-
versy between two parties equally guilty-why should not 
the same rule be applied to the instant case' 
It should perhaps be noted that the trial court limited the 
recovery by the plaintiff to a half-interest in the property 
acquired during the period the parties cohabited subse-
quent to the divorce of the first wife and prior to defen-
dant's marriage to his second wife, hence no equities of third 
parties intervene, and the only question involved is that of 
the equities between the parties. To permit the defendant 
to retain the entire fruits of their joint efforts is contrary to 
the dictates of simple justice. 
Carter, J., and Peters, J. pro tem., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 29, 
1943. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a hearing. 
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